Is two better than one? Effects on growth of Bank-Fund interaction by Sivlai Marchesi & Emanuela Sirtori
 
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS 




WORKING PAPER SERIES 
 
 
Is two better than one? Effects on growth of 
Bank-Fund interaction 
 
Silvia Marchesi, Emanuela Sirtori  











Dipartimento di Economia Politica 
Università degli Studi di Milano - Bicocca 
http://dipeco.economia.unimib.it Is two better than one? Eﬀects on growth of
Bank-Fund interaction
Silvia Marchesi∗
Università di Milano Bicocca and Centro Studi Luca D’Agliano
Emanuela Sirtori
CSIL - Centre for Industrial Studies, Milano
June 2010
Abstract
We estimate the impact on economic growth of the joint participation in both IMF
and WB programs. More speciﬁcally, using panel data for 128 developing countries
over the period 1982-2005, and employing 2SLS to control for the possible endogeneity
of participation in an IMF/WB program, we ﬁnd that even if the WB and the IMF
do not boost growth when they operate by themselves, the interaction term between
these two organization is positive and signiﬁcant at conventional levels. However,
when we restrict the sample to low and lower middle income countries only (for which
Bank-Fund cooperation is more “formalized”) the coeﬃcient of the interaction term
is not signiﬁcant. Thus, so far, a trade-oﬀ emerges between a greater precision in
the deﬁnition of Bank-Fund cooperation and the reliability of the estimates due to an
insuﬃcient number of observations.
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11 Introduction
The focus of this paper is the interaction between the two most important multilateral
organizations, i.e., the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. While the IMF
and the WB were originally established at Bretton Woods to complement one another in
promoting economic stability and growth, more recently the degree of overlap between the
two has increased, leading to more room for both conﬂict and cooperation.
Despite a series of agreements aimed at strengthening Bank-Fund cooperation, little
empirical evidence exists about how and under what circumstances these two organizations
work together. It is therefore diﬃcult to assess whether and when this interaction is eﬃcient
and decide if it should be encouraged and/or what should be improved.
The announcement of new principles for Bank-Fund collaboration in 1998 served as a
departure from earlier practices speciﬁcally in addressing weaknesses of past mechanisms
for Bank-Fund cooperation. However, the principles alone were hardly suﬃcient to lead to
changes on the operational level. To trigger these changes, the two organizations introduced
new processes and procedures which vary between diﬀerent groups of countries. The Poverty
Reduction Strategy Project (PRSP) approach is one example of a more formal mechanism
aimed at enhancing cooperation.1 The PRSP not only serves as the basis for all lending
operations of the Bank and the Fund but also for other organizations. Dealings with middle-
income countries, however, are not guided by any formal process. The Bank and the Fund
rely on their traditional lending instruments and, as a result, they cooperate less formally
with middle-income countries than with low-income countries.
In this paper, we assess the impact of the interaction between the IMF and the World
Bank on economic growth. Since there are no data describing whether and under what
circumstances the IMF and the WB work together, the only information we could get was
whether or not they are lending to the same country at the same time. We are of course
aware that lending simultaneously to the same country does not necessarily mean that these
two organizations are actually working together, but we assume that, ceteris paribus,i tw i l l
be more likely that these institutions are interacting when contemporaneously “involved”
with the same country as compared to the case in which they are on their own. Thus,
in order to evaluate whether collaboration is really eﬀective we then perform an empirical
analysis in which we compare the (4-year) GDP variation when a country is jointly involved
with the World Bank and the IMF with the GDP variation of a country which is involved
only with one of these two organizations.
1It typically consists of four core elements, i.e., a description of the country’s participatory process;
poverty diagnosis and targets; indicators and monitoring systems; and priority public actions.
2We will ﬁrst investigate the impact on growth of the amount of credit disbursed under
all IMF and World Bank programs. Then, since in the case of low income countries there is
more room for formal cooperation, we will also evaluate the impact on growth of the typical
lending schemes designed for low income countries (i.e. concessional lending). Unfortunately,
as the quota of IMF concessional loans represent only a very small fraction of its total
disbursements, a trade oﬀ emerges between the degree of accuracy in the choice of the better
proxy for Bank-Fund interaction and the degree of reliability of our estimates, due to a
number of observations which is too low.
In what follows, Section 2 contains some institutional information regarding the over-
lap/cooperation between the IMF and the WB while Section 3 surveys the existing litera-
ture both on IMF/WB cooperation and on their (individual) impact on growth. Section 4
describes the empirical model and in Section 5 the estimation results are presented. Finally,
Section 6 concludes.
2 Overlap and cooperation between the IMF and the
World Bank
The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund were created with diﬀerent speciﬁc
roles but with the same ﬁnal goal of bringing stability and development. The Fund was
responsible for ﬁnancial stability in the Bretton Woods system, while the Bank was in charge
of coordinating the assistance to the European countries after the Second World War. Over
time, their functions have expanded. On the one hand, the Bank started promoting economic
development also in the poorest and most disadvantaged countries in the world. On the other,
the Fund enlarged its ﬁeld of intervention from ﬁnancial to economic reconstruction, dealing
with countries in temporary crisis as well as with those in structural diﬃculties.
Up to the 1980s, the division of labour between the Fund and the Bank had been rela-
tively straightforward. While the Fund’s orientation was towards short-run macroeconomic
stability, the Bank was oriented towards long-run development programmes. During the
1980s, Fund’s lending became more concessional and related to structural matters and in-
creasingly focused on lower income countries, those typically “served” by the Bank. With
the creation of both Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF) and Enhanced Structural Ad-
justment Facility (ESAF), later substituted by the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility,
(PRGF), in terminology as well as in areas of involvement, structural adjustment had served
to create an important area of overlap between the two. Such overlap between the Fund and
the Bank is particularly relevant when these two organization are involved with the same
countries.
3The ﬁrst steps toward formal collaboration between the World Bank and the IMF were
made in 1974, when the Development Committee (DC) was established. The DC is a joint
ministerial committee of the Boards of Governors of the Bank and the Fund and it is in charge
of advising both institutions on critical development issues and on the ﬁnancial resources
required to promote economic growth in developing countries. The Committee assures a high-
level coordination and it facilitates intergovernmental consensus-building on development
issues.
In 1989 a Concordat was signed by the IMF and the World Bank in which the similar-
ities as well as the diﬀerences among their responsibilities were recognized. According to
such “agreement,” the Bank should be focused on the design of programs fostering economic
growth and development by promoting sector investments, setting priorities on government’
spending, reforming the administrative system and restructuring public enterprises. While
the Fund should guarantee ﬁnancial stability by providing a forum for cooperation on in-
ternational monetary problems, promoting exchange rate stability and helping countries
addressing their balance of payments problems. These are the areas where each institution
has oﬃcial mandate and primary responsibility. But there is also a vast area that is subject
to the interest of both: structure and management of ﬁnancial institutions, access to capital
market, countries’ savings and ﬁnancial implication of development.
In this common area, collaboration should be pursued and strengthened as it allows a
better awareness of the economic problems and of the policy options. The Concordat does
deﬁne guidelines and terms of Bank-Fund interaction in order to ensure eﬀective cooperation
in the areas where their responsibilities actually overlap. Both institutions commit them-
selves to systemically exchange information concerning not only low income countries but
also middle-income ones. Moreover, the Concordat encourages them to exchange countries’
information non only within their decision bodies, but also at the level of the operative staﬀ.
A more recent report (2007) underlines as well the importance of Bank-Fund cooperation,
emphasizing, on the one hand, that duplicate functions represent a waste of resources for
both institutions and, on the other, that uncoordinated policy prescriptions can make it
harder for recipients dealing with these organizations’ adjustment programs.
Today the IMF and the World Bank collaborate regularly to assist member countries
and they work together on several initiatives. Collaboration can be found at diﬀerent levels
and under many forms. For example, high-level coordination manifests itself both in the
annual meeting of the IMF and WB’s Boards of Governors (when priorities and strategies
for collaboration are actually set) and in the Development Committee meetings, where a
selection of IMF and WB’s Governors participate. At the management level, the managing
director of the IMF and the President of the World Bank meet regularly in Washington and
4often visit together developing countries. Finally, at the operative level, the staﬀ members of
the two institutions regularly exchange information and conduct country missions together.
In late 1999, to enhance the contribution of their interventions to international poverty
reduction eﬀorts, the IMF and the WB adopted a new strategy for their assistance to low-
income countries. The main aspects of this strategy were twofold: (i) both institutions
base their concessional lending and debt relief to low-income countries on Poverty Reduction
Strategy Papers (PRSPs) prepared by the countries themselves; and (ii) IMF concessional
lending was to be provided through a revised lending facility, the Poverty Reduction and
Growth Facility (PRGF), with a stronger poverty reduction focus. In particular, a PRSP
aims at increasing the participation of the recipients to the design and the implementation of
a poverty reduction program and it does represent a good example of collaboration between
the two ﬁnancial institutions, who should speak to the country with one voice. A PRSP sets
out the strategy that a country should follow to promote growth and reduce poverty. This
approach requires the Bank and the Fund to have the same time horizon and to share their
experiences on ﬁnancial and development programs. At the same time it requires a greater
country’s ownership and a broader based support from the public in order to succeed.
In the same year, the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative was enhanced
as a direct outcome of a comprehensive review carried out by IDA (the Bank’s concessional
arm for low-income countries) and the IMF, such initiative entails a coordinated commitment
to reduce and forgive large volume of debts to the poorest and most indebted countries.2
Finally, in 1999 as well, the Bank and the Fund launched the Financial Sector Assessment
Program (FSAP), to reduce the vulnerabilities of member countries’ ﬁnancial system.
However, dealings with middle-income countries are not guided by any formal process,
like the PRSP or the related facilities in the two organizations. As a result, the Bank and the
Fund cooperate less formally with middle-income countries than with low-income countries
and their cooperation hinges critically on eﬀective communication at the staﬀ level. Since
Bank and Fund staﬀs are not required to prepare any joint document, ensuring consistency
between them is even more challenging, as it requires Bank and Fund staﬀ to make extra
eﬀorts in order to achieve the necessary level of communication.
2In 2005, the HIPC Initiative was supplemented by the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI), in
order to help accelerate progress toward the United Nations Millennium Development Goals. The MDRI
allows for 100 percent relief on eligible debts by three multilateral institutions (the IMF, the World Bank,
and the African Development Fund) for countries completing the HIPC Initiative process.
53 Related literature
3.1 Coordination
T oo u rk n o w l e d g et h e r ei sa l m o s tn oe v i d e n c eo nt h ec i r c u m s t a n c e sa n do nt h ee ﬀects of
IMF-WB collaboration. As a consequence it is virtually impossible to assess whether such
collaboration should be pursued or not. In a recent survey, Dreher (2009), underlines the
risk of a duplication of conditions (harmful to the borrowers) when the IMF enters the WB
traditional sphere of inﬂuence in long-term development reforms.3 Moreover, IMF programs,
which focus on ﬁscal and monetary discipline, may not ﬁt well the poorest countries, which
are more likely to face structural and temporary problems. Bordo and James (2000) argues
that even if joining Bank-Fund competencies and eﬀorts could increase the overall eﬀective-
ness of their programs, “merging” these two institutions could be wiser, in order to avoid
the risk of duplication and to reduce bureaucracy and operative costs.
There is no empirical work, however, which tries to assess the eﬀect of Bank-Fund interac-
tion. One exception is Fabricius (2007) who, drawing on ﬁeld research conducted in Ghana,
Pakistan, Peru, and Vietnam,over the period 1980-96, has tried to identify the conditions
that determine whether or not these organizations are actually collaborating, addressing as
well whether such collaboration is necessarily a good thing. First of all, he provides a deﬁni-
tion of cooperation between the Fund and the Bank introducing the notion of “consistency”,
or agreement between these two institutions. Speciﬁcally, the Bank and the Fund are said
to cooperate when they take consistent stances vis-a-vis third parties (e.g., recipient govern-
ments and other donors). For cooperation to be most eﬀective that the two organizations
should ﬁr s ta d h e r et oap r i n c i p l eo fd i v i s i o no fl a b o r. In particular, whenever one of the two
organizations has a clear comparative advantage in a speciﬁc area, it should lead the design
of the policy advice in that area. Typically, the Fund should rely on the Bank’s expertise in
matters relating to development lending and focus its resources on its core responsibilities
of macroeconomic and ﬁnancial sector matters.
According to Fabricius’ results, Bank-Fund cooperation (or consistency) depends criti-
cally on the level of communication between the two organizations, where such exchange
of information is not generally institutionalized but it has been subject to the decisions of
individuals.4 In his paper, Fabricius found only a few instances in which the exchange of
information between the Bank and the Fund could be characterized as institutionalized. In-
stead, Bank-Fund interaction mainly depends on the preferences and on the personal styles
3Such risk of duplication is also emphasized by Erika Gould (2003).
4The main exception being the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) which are prepared by
the countries themselves together with the World Bank and the IMF but which apply only to low-income
countries.
6of the individuals (i.e., the staﬀ members). In turn, whether or not the Bank and the Fund
cooperate has been found to depend on two conditions, which are highly correlated. Namely,
similarity in the Bank’s and the Fund’s organizational structures (which facilitates commu-
nication) and the so called “domain consensus” (i.e. the degree to which they consent to
the domain of their respective activities in the division of labor). Furthermore, the evidence
collected at the country level suggests that the most diﬃcult factor that Bank and Fund staﬀ
must overcome to ensure domain consensus is the diﬀerence between the two organizations’
operational styles (the Fund remains a highly centralized organization while the Bank has
gradually decentralized its operations to the borrowing countries).
Finally, an important implication emerging from this study is that Bank-Fund consis-
tency may not always be desirable. Since there is an emerging consensus that International
Organizations should possess country-speciﬁc knowledge and promote “ownership” and in-
stitution building in order to formulate sound policy recommendations (e.g., see Dixit, 2009;
Easterly, 2006, 2008; Rajan, 2008), Fabricius proposes that the Bank and the Fund pursue a
case-speciﬁc approach in deciding whether they should take the same stance. A more ﬂexible
approach may not only increase the recipient countries’ ownership but also the implementa-
tion and sustainability of their policy choices.
Furthermore, as far as aid is concerned, the so called “new rethoric on aid” (among
o t h e ro b j e c t i v e ss u c ha si n c r e a s i n ga i dﬂows to achieve the Millennium Development Goals
or promoting a greater donors’ selectivity), has indeed emphasized the importance of pro-
moting multiple donors coordination and encouraging reforms’ ownership in recipient coun-
tries. Although it is clear that ownership could be improved by basing reform designs on
context-speciﬁc knowledge, less is known, however, on the speciﬁc mechanisms and on the
circumstances under which such information should be transferred by recipient countries to
multilateral institutions. In fact, countries’ local knowledge often consists of unveriﬁable
information (or veriﬁable only at high costs). Hence, the quality of the reports crucially
depends on the conﬂict of interest faced by the sender (the recipient) and the receiver (the
multilateral).
For example, Marchesi et al. (2009), in a cheap talk framework, compare the performance
of a “delegation-scheme” against a “centralization-scheme.” They ﬁnd that recipients’ dis-
cretion in the choice of reforms (delegation) should be increased only when countries’ local
knowledge is strictly more important than the information of the multilateral. Conversely,
a reduction in the conﬂict of interests may lead the multilateral to leave the recipient less
freedom in designing reforms (centralization).
In a recent theoretical paper Hagen (2010) addresses the speciﬁc issue of how ownership
could be aﬀected by introducing more or less donors’ coordination. In his model, increasing
7delegation (ownership) in aid ﬂows would be associated to giving money either with “no-
conditions-attached” or with conditions to be only monitored on outcomes. More speciﬁcally,
Hagen uses a signalling game in which countries’ governments reveal or conceal their private
info about the state of the economy only through their policy-choice.5 He shows that real
ownership may be a possibility, as a separating equilibrium exists for some parameter values,
but conformity (i.e.. pooling equilibrium) in recipient decision-making is a deﬁnite possibility
too. In fact, conformity leads to a loss, as the marginal aid impact decreases (government
do not to make full use of their private information), but to a gain as well, since the total
amount of aid ﬂows increases (donors are more willing to donate to countries whose policy
choices are more aligned with their preferences) and there are circumstances under which
the latter eﬀect dominates the former. As a consequence, in order to maximize aid ﬂows,
even under full delegation conformity in policy-choices with the donor (the “H-Street Waltz)
may be the equilibrium.
In the case of multiple (uncoordinated) donors other issues emerge. Donors coordination
is indeed a critical matter involving pros and cons. More generally, one advantage of coor-
dination would be to reduce the transaction costs of aid, with the possible risk, however,
that a single donor might be “locked in” with a country. In other words there is a trade
oﬀ between learning about a country over time and being locked-in, which perversely aﬀect
the incentives of the recipients in complying with the donor’s requests. More importantly:
what are the impact of donors’ coordination on promoting countries’ ownership? According
to Hagen, as far as ownership is concerned, donors coordination could have some indirect
costs. In other words the reduced transaction costs must be weighed against potentially
greater pressure for conformity which would emerge when there is a ”lead donors” and a
silent partnerships by the others. In conclusion, coordination, in the sense of suﬃcient con-
vergence of donors’ views, is important as it may ensure separation. To be eﬀective, however,
it is crucial that such coordination emerges as the result of joint missions, reviews, analysis
and/or broad/rapid dissemination of ﬁndings (exchange of information).
Applying Hagen’s result to the Fund-Bank relationship (which are multiple lenders), we
could conclude that (in line with the case studies’ analysis carried out by Fabricius) Fund-
Bank coordination is not necessarily “a good thing”. In fact, greater coordination (especially
in the case of a “lead lender” and of a silent partner) could generate some pressure for
conformity, which may contrast with the objective of enhancing recipients’ ownership. Then,
to be eﬀective, Bank-Fund coordination should require constructive engagement among the
agents and not a leader/follower type of relationship.
5In his model, the donor acts like a “money machine”, in other words it is not at all involved in the design
of conditionality.
83 . 2 I m p a c to ng r o w t ho fI M F - W B ’ sp r o g r a m s
While there are many papers investigating the individual impact of both the IMF and WB’
programs on recipient countries’ growth, to our knowledge, there is no empirical work taking
into account the impact of their “joint participation.” The empirical evidence evaluating the
impact on growth of the IMF and WB adjustment programs is deﬁnitely disappointing in the
ﬁrst case (e.g., Przeworski, Vreeland, 2000; Barro, Lee, 2005; Dreher, 2006; Easterly, 2005)
and a little more optimistic in the second one (e.g., Burnside and Dollar, 2000; Mallick and
Moore, 2005; Butkiewicz and Yanikkaya, 2004). In general, however, the results obtained
are far from being conclusive as they suggest positive, zero or negative eﬀects of adjustment
lending and credit on growth for both IMF and World Bank programs.
Dicks-Mireaux, Mecagni, Schadler (2000) used a control-group methodology to measure
the eﬀect of IMF support on three key variables: output growth, inﬂation, and the external
debt service ratio in a sample restricted to low-income countries during 1986—1991.6 Using
this approach the sample reveals statistically signiﬁcant beneﬁcial eﬀects of IMF support on
output growth and the debt service ratio but no eﬀects on inﬂation.7 Przeworski, Vreeland
(2000), using a bivariate, dynamic version of the Heckman selection model, estimate the eﬀect
of participation in IMF programs on economic growth. They ﬁnd evidence that governments
enter into agreements with the IMF under the pressures of a foreign reserves crisis but they
also bring in the Fund to shield themselves from the political costs of adjustment policies.
Program participation lowers growth rates for as long as countries remain under a program.
Once countries leave the program, they grow faster than if they had remained, but not faster
than they would have without participation.
According to Easterly (2005), the analysis of multilateral adjustment loans has often
overlooked their repetition to the same country (the so called “prolonged use” of multilateral
lending). More speciﬁcally, he ﬁnds that, among the top 20 recipients of adjustments loans
(from both the IMF and the World Bank), in the period 1980-99, the probability to get a new
adjustment loan does not decrease with the number of loans already received (it actually
seems to increase after ten cumulative loans). Moreover, none of these top 20 recipients
were able to achieve reasonable growth and about half of them show severe macroeconomic
distortions regardless of cumulative adjustment loans. An instrumental variables regression
for estimating the causal eﬀect of repeated adjustment lending on policies fails to show any
positive eﬀect on policies or growth.
6Under the “control group approach” a policy counterfactual (i.e., policies that would have been followed
in the absence of IMF support against which to compare actual policies and resulting outcomes) is estimated.
7Diagnostic tests of these results, however, are shown to be critical in interpreting the validity of the
results of assessments of adjustment lending.
9Barro and Lee (2005) analyze the eﬀects that IMF’s short-term stabilization programs
(Stand-By Agreements and Extended Fund Facility) have on per capita GDP, in a panel of
86 countries, during 5-year period from 1975-80 to 1995-2000. Their variables of interest are
the IMF loan size and the program participation rate, expressed as fraction of months during
each 5-year period that a country operated under an IMF loan program. They controls for
the economic and institutional variables most commonly used in this literature, such as the
log of per capita GDP at the start of each period, educational attainment, life expectancy,
fertility rate, the ratio of investment to GDP, government consumption, inﬂation, trade
openness, changes in the terms of trade, rule of law and an index for democracy.
Barro and Lee are among the ﬁrst authors using political and institutional instrumental
variables to instrument programs participation and loan size. They assume that both loans
size and program participation are inﬂuenced by some institutional and political variable,
such as a country’s share of IMF quotas; share of a country’s nationals among the IMF pro-
fessional staﬀ of economists;8 political proximity to the US and major Europe (i.e., fraction
of votes that each country casts in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) along with
the US or with major Europe, i.e., France, Germany, UK); economic proximity to the US
and major Europe (i.e. ratio of a country’s bilateral trade with the US /major Europe to a
country’s GDP). In particular, loans tend to be larger and more frequent when a country (a)
has a bigger quota and more professional staﬀ at the IMF (b) is more connected politically
and economically to the United States and to major European countries
After instrumenting for programs participation as well as for loan size, their results prove
an o n - s i g n i ﬁcant link between the loan size and GDP growth, and a negative inﬂuence of
numbers of programs on GDP. Barro and Lee’s research is extremely important, non only for
their results, which are robust and attest that IMF programs are not eﬀective in promoting
growth (at least in the short/medium-term), but also for the kind of instrumental variable
they used. The signiﬁcance of the political variables prove that the IMF, in identifying the
recipient countries, is driven by its major stakeholders interests, ﬁr s to fa l lt h o s eo ft h eU S .
Dreher (2006), using similar variables to Barro and Lee, conﬁrms that IMF programs reduces
economic growth, when endogeneity is considered, and he also points out that compliance
with conditionality mitigates such negative eﬀect.
There are not as numerous studies on the eﬀect of the World Bank programs as on those
investigating the eﬀect of the IMF ones. Butkiewicz and Yanikkan (2004) jointly studied
the eﬀe c t so fI M Fa n dW o r l dB a n kl e n d i n go nl o n g - r u ne c o n o m i cg r o w t ho nas a m p l eo f
100 countries for ﬁve-years periods between 1970 and 1999. The model includes the most
8Although own nationals cannot work directly as desk economists or mission team members of their home
countries, they are often sought out for comments on country programs as they might have good information.
10common variables: the initial level of real GDP per capita, lagged life expectancy as a
proxy of human capital, a measure of democracy, lagged fertility rates, the extent of trade
openness, government consumption, inﬂation, a dummy indicating if a war is taking place on
the national territory and regional dummies. As instruments for the 3SLS model, the authors
used diﬀerent variables: female educational attainment, a dummy for IMF or WB previous
programme, indicating recidivism, a dummy for countries having a British or French legal
system and other economic variables.
Consistently with the literature, Butkiewicz and Yanikkan ﬁnd that the IMF lending has
an e g a t i v ee ﬀect on GDP growth, although small. In particular, a 1% increase in lending
appears to reduce growth by 0.1% per year. The Bank lending is estimated to have very
little negative but not signiﬁcant eﬀect. This is conﬁrmed by the 3SLS model. However,
while the IMF lending reduces aggregate public investments, the Bank appears to increase
it, generating a positive indirect eﬀect. Butkiewicz and Yanikkan underline the diﬃculty in
ﬁnding good instrumental variables.
The analysis of Mallick and Moore (2005) analysis is more optimistic. First of all they
notice that the recent literature on the eﬀectiveness of World Bank lending is either too
general or too speciﬁc. In the ﬁrst case, the impact of aid coming from all the multilateral
institutions (such as World Bank, European Commission, Regional Development Banks) is
considered. In the second case, the analysis is focused on the eﬀects of single programmes of
either the concessional loans provided by the International Development Association (IDA)
or of the structural adjustment loans provided by the International Bank for Reconstruction
and Development (IBRD). This approach prevents from identifying the overall eﬀectiveness
of World Bank interventions in the recipient countries.
They regress the variation of GDP over the WB lending, both concessional (IDA) and not
concessional (IBRD), exchange rate, domestic credit and price level. The sample considers
30 countries over a period of 32 years, since 1970 to 2001. They ﬁnd that the IDA has a
robust positive impact on the GDP long-term growth. This is conﬁrmed also after taking
into account the possible endogeneity bias with a 2SLS model and diﬀerent instrumental
variables, such as the interaction between World Bank lending and GDP or the same policy
index used in Burnside and Dollar (2000). Since the policy index is signiﬁcant, the authors
conﬁrm that the World Bank positive impact depends on the existence of a good policy
environment.
Burnside and Dollar (2000) measured multilateral and bilateral aid impact on GDP, with
a panel of 56 countries between 1970 and 1993. While it does not appear the existence of a
strong relationship between growth and the amount of aid received, when aid is interacted
with a policy index (which takes into account inﬂation, budget surplus and openness) the
11coeﬃcient of this interaction term is positive and signiﬁcant. These results however are
not robust, when the time period is extended from to 1993 to 1997 (Easterly et al. 2004),
the coeﬃcient of the interaction term between policy and aid becomes insigniﬁcant. Apart
from the Burnside and Dollar’s study, the literature trying to explicate the aid-growth nexus
is inconclusive (among all see Rajan Subramanian, 2008), showing in general a very weak
relation.
Dollar and Svensson (2000) do not directly ask whether aid is aﬀective but looks at
other factors that may aﬀect the probability of success of WB’ programs, given that there
is ﬁnancial support for the reform program.9 They ﬁnd that success or failure of reforms
is highly correlated with improvements in observed economic indicators, such as the rate
of inﬂation or the extent of budget surplus, and it hugely depends on domestic political
economy forces. A few donor eﬀort variables are also highly correlated with the probability
of success, however, once these eﬀort variables are treated as endogenous, there is no more
relationship between any of them and the success or failure of reform.
Given the overall disappointing evidence on the eﬀects of adjustment programs on growth
and the importance that political economy variables have in explaining program participa-
tion, political factors (i.e. poor selectivity) have been presented as one of the main reasons
accountable for the poor performance of IFI’s programs in promoting growth and develop-
ment. Dreher et al. (2010), for example, ﬁnd evidence that World Bank project quality
suﬀers as a consequence of political inﬂuence (such as those granted to governments holding
a non-permanent seat on the UNSC or an Executive Directorship at the World Bank) but
only when the recipient country is economically vulnerable in the ﬁrst place.
4 Empirical model
The present paper contributes to the debate around the eﬀects of the World Bank and IMF
lending on recipients’ economic growth. Our main aim is to estimate the impact that the
collaboration of these two ﬁnancial institutions have on growth. It is acknowledged that
the two institutions regularly talk and exchange information each other, but, despite some
exceptions (like the PRSP) such interaction is not “institutionalized” and it depends on
circumstances which cannot be empirically evaluated. Therefore, it is very diﬃcult to assess
empirically whether and under what circumstances such interaction can be beneﬁcial or not.
In this paper we propose a ﬁrst and tentative way to measure Bank-Fund collaboration
that consists in using the interaction term between WB and IMF disbursements as a proxy
9Reform outcome measure used is a zero-one dummy reﬂecting failure or success of each reform program
as determined by the Operations Evaluation Department (OED) of the World Bank.
12for their cooperation. The underlying hypothesis is that, ceteris paribus, these institutions
are more likely to cooperate when they are simultaneously involved with the same country
at the same time. The model then tests the inﬂuence that all WB disbursements, all IMF
disbursements and the interaction between WB and IMF loans have on per capita GDP
growth. This speciﬁcation then allows to compare the impact of the only WB or IMF
intervention with the case of the simultaneous presence of the two organizations.
A positive and signiﬁcant impact of the coeﬃcient of the interacted term on growth
would then imply that, if our proxy is correct, stimulating the collaboration between these
two organizations could be a way to make their intervention more eﬀective. Thus, enhancing
and formalizing their cooperation would be an objective which deserves to be pursued.
4.1 Data
The dependent variable is the average four-year growth rate of per capita GDP. Our
choice to use four-year averages, instead of annual data, depends on the assumption that
programs’ eﬀects can be evaluated only after some years from the agreement, that is in only
in the medium-term.
In Section 5.1, we start estimating the impact on growth of all IMF and WB disburse-
ments and then we restrict the types of loans to concessional loans only. More speciﬁcally,
as the World Bank is concerned, we start considering the sum of its concessional (IDA) and
not-concessional (IBRD) disbursements, as a percentage of GDP. This variable includes the
so-called Development Policy Lending, which provide untied direct budget support for pol-
icy and institutional reforms aimed at achieving a set of development results, among which
growth and poverty reduction, and the Investment Loans, a more ﬂexible instrument that
provide speciﬁc and sectoral investments. In the case of the IMF, we include all disburse-
ments, as a share of GDP, allocated in the form of Stand By Arrangements, Extended Fund
Facility, Structural Adjustment Facility, Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility /Poverty
Reduction and Growth Facility.
In Section 5.2 we reduce the sample to low income and lower middle income countries,
then considering only on IMF concessional net ﬂows and on IDA net ﬂows. The reason
why we focused on poorer countries was trying to obtain a better proxy for Bank-Fund
interaction. In fact, contrary to middle income countries, in the case of low income and
lower-middle income countries, the Fund and the Bank are supposed to cooperate more
formally. This greater “precision” in the deﬁnition of our proxy, however, came with the
cost of reducing approximately by half our original sample.
Table 1 lists the 128 countries of our sample.10 These countries receive assistance pre-
10Among them there are some case in which no interaction occurred over the all 6 periods, implying that
13dominately by the World Bank only. More precisely, there are only few cases in which only
an IMF programme is active. This circumstance should not be surprising as our deﬁnition
of WB is very broad: it included both investment operations and development policy opera-
tions. However, this will also be true after reducing the sample of countries to lower income
countries.
Our choice of the control variables is standard, according to the literature analyzing the
eﬀects of both IMF/WB programs and of foreign aid. Our selection includes economic, insti-
tutional, and social variables More speciﬁcally, we control for the log of GDP per capita at
the start of each period, investments as a percentage of GDP, the rate of inﬂation, govern-
ment consumption as a percentage of GDP, a measure of openness (exports and imports over
GDP), M2 as a percentage of GDP (as a measure of ﬁnancial development), “Corruption”
and “Internal conﬂict” as a measure of “institutional capacity” and “socioeconomic com-
plexity.” These two variables are taken from the International Country Risk Guide’s (ICRG)
indicators: these (subjective) indices range from zero to 12, with higher values showing “bet-
ter” environments (PRS Group 1998). “Corruption ” is a measure of corruption within the
political system. Such corruption is a threat to foreign investment for several reasons: it
distorts the economic and ﬁnancial environment, it reduces the eﬃciency of government and
business by enabling people to assume positions of power through patronage rather than
ability, and, last but not least, introduces an inherent instability into the political process.
The lowest rating is given to the least corrupted countries. “Internal conﬂict” is an assess-
ment of political violence in the country and its actual or potential impact on governance.
The highest rating is given to those countries where there is no armed opposition to the
government and the government does not indulge in arbitrary violence, direct or indirect,
against its own people. The lowest rating is given to a country embroiled in an on-going
civil war.11
When estimating the growth regression by OLS there might be the problem with the
endogeneity of both the IMF and the WB variables as adjustment programs are usually
concluded in periods of economic crisis. For this reasons, the coeﬃcient measuring the
eﬀect, of the program’s adoption on growth can be downward biased as there maybe a
selection problem. The same is true for the amount of money disbursed which is probably
in not even one of the six considered periods the country received contemporary assistance by the Bank and
the Fund.
11We tried to control for some of the other ICRG indicators (such as investment proﬁle, law and order,
a n de t h n i ct e n s i o n s )a n dw ea l s oi n c l u d e da ni n d e xo fd e m o c r a c y( a sd e ﬁn e di nt h eP o l i t yI Vd a t a s e t )a n d
our results are unchanged. We also tried to include some measures for human resources (life expectancy and
fertility rate), and "education" but missing data reduced the sample substantially, so we do not report the
results below. We have also included the KOF Index of Globalization and its subcomponent on economic
restrictions (http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch/). Diﬀerent speciﬁcations are available upon request.
14correlated with the severity of the crisis. Obviously selection problems are also related to
the interaction term between IMF programs and World Bank operations. To deal with the
selection problem we follow an instrumental variables approach.12 The challenge with the
instrumental variable approach is clearly ﬁnding variables that aﬀect the loan’ size without
aﬀecting economic growth other than through their impact on the disbursed loan.
Our choice of the instruments is based on the literature describing the determinants
of both multilateral lending and foreign aid. The factors aﬀecting multilateral lending can
be summarized as it follows. (1) Their main responsibility of both institutions is to assist
countries in ﬁnancial need, either to solve temporary crises or to solve more structural dif-
ﬁculties which prevent them from developing.13 (2) The second reason which may aﬀect
multilateral lending is to concede a preferential treatment to Western allies. There is sub-
stantial empirical evidence linking a country’s geopolitical proximity to the Fund’s Western
shareholders with a variety of types of preferential treatment (e.g., Thacker, 1999; Barro
and Lee, 2002; Dreher and Jensen, 2007; Dreher et al. 2008a; Dreher et al. 2008b, Stone,
2008).14 The inﬂuence on the World Bank of political aspects has been less investigated
but there is still some evidence documenting their impact in credit allocation (e.g. Dreher,
Sturm and Vreeland, 2009; Kaja and Werker, 2009; Kilby, 2009).
More speciﬁcally, Barro and Lee (2005) ﬁnd that IMF loans tend to be larger and more
frequent when a country is more connected politically and economically to the United States
and major European countries. Dreher et al. (2008b, 2009) and Kuziemko and Werker (2006)
use membership in the UN Security Council as a political variable.15 Dreher et al. (2008b),
with a dataset of 157 countries between 1870 and 2004, holding eﬀects of other economic
factors ﬁxed, ﬁnd that whenever a country holds a seat as UNSC temporary member there
is higher probability to sign an agreement with the IMF. Dreher et al. (2009) extend the
conclusions derived for the IMF to the World Bank and they ﬁnd that being a temporary
member of the UNSC explains the probability to be under a WB program too.16 Kaja and
12The Heckman (1979) approach, for example, is best when the selection variable is dichotomous while
instrumental variables is preferable when the selection variables are continuous, which is the case here
(Dreher, 2006).
13In particular , the IMF should take into account moral hazard issues related to be a lender of last resort,
the need to be repaid and the importance of inducing some catalytic eﬀect (e.g., Mody, A. and D. Saravia,
2003; Morris and Shin, 2006; Marchesi, 2003).
14Such preferential treatment may also be induced by the systemic importance of a single country (the so
called “too big to fail” argument).
15UNSC votes on UN military action against aggressors and investigating disputes. It holds 5 permanent
members with veto power (China, Francia, Russia, US, UK) and 10 elected members (with 2 year term
limits). As decisions require 9 votes temporary members can be pivotal in many decisions.
16Speciﬁcally, Dreher et al. (2008b, 2009) show that while UNSC membership signiﬁcantly aﬀect the
probability to be under an IMF and a WB program, neither IMF nor WB loans are signiﬁcantly aﬀected by
temporary UNSC membership.
15Werker (2009) ﬁnd that the World Bank Board of Executive Director explains well the IBRD
allocation and level of funding, while this is not true for the IDA credit. The authors suggest
that for IDA countries, which are the poorest and neediest one, the voting power is not as
relevant as the actual economic and social problems.17
(3) Finally, the last motivation may be inﬂuenced by such institutions themselves being
self interested agents, in other words their actions may be aﬀected by their need to “survive”
as institutions. For example, by their need to protect their own reputation as a lender (i.e.,
defensive lending or defensive granting) (e.g., see Ramcharan, 2003; Marchesi and Missale,
2007) or as a monitor/advisor (in the case of the IMF, Marchesi and Sabani, 2007a, 2007b).
In sum as instruments we use both political-economy variables (voting in-line with the US
and major Europe in the UNGA and a dummy for being a temporary member of the UNSC)
and economic variables referring to the so called "defensive lending" hypothesis (IMF debt
service, WB debt service and cumulative years under IMF programs), as they are derived
from the standard literature on the allocation of both IMF and WB loans (see (1) and (2)
above). Additional instruments we use are LIBOR, IMF quota.
The major problem was ﬁnding an instrument for the interaction term. As the interaction
between the IMF and the WB has been poorly investigated before, it is no clear what
could be the speciﬁc determinants of such interaction, that is variables able to explain the
presence in a country of both organizations without being correlated with a country’s growth.
Thus, besides including (some of) the variables listed above we instrumented the interaction
term with a dummy for a country having published at least one document concerning a
PRSP.18 More speciﬁcally, we argue that since (for poorer countries) having a PRSP without
a disbursement is indeed much rarer than the opposite case (i.e., a concessional loan without
a PRSP) we argued that the impact of a PRSP on growth could only be indirect, namely it
will not aﬀect economic growth other than through its impact on the disbursed loan.19
Table 2 contains the details of the deﬁnitions and sources of the variables included in the
regressions below. Descriptive statistics are provided in the Appendix.
TABLE 1 HERE: list of countries
TABLE 2 HERE: sources and deﬁnition
17Kuziemko and Werker (2006) Find that a country’s US aid increases by 54 percent and its UN aid by 7
percent when it rotates onto the council.”
18For example, see http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPRS1/Resources/prsp_progress_2004.pdf)
19At least considering our sample which ends in 2005, only a few years after the creation of the PRSPs.
165 Estimation results
5.1 Full sample
The regression is a pooled time series cross section analysis. The dependent variable is
averaged over four years as we want to measure the impact of multilateral programs on the
medium term, we chose four-year averages in order to increase the number of observations
(e.g., Burnside and Dollar, 2000; Collier and Dollar, 2001). The control variables, the
instruments and our variables of interest are averaged over four years, too.
T h ea n a l y s i sc o v e rt h ey e a r s1 9 8 2 - 2 0 0 5( i . e . ,s i xt i m ep e r i o d s )a n de x t e n d st o1 2 8d e v e l -
oping countries. Since some of the data are not available for all countries or periods, the
panel data are unbalanced and the number of observations depends on the control variables
we include.
Speciﬁcally, we test:
Git = α + βXit + γZit + ηi + uit (1)
where Git represents per capita growth in country i at period t, X is a vector containing our
variables of interest, and Z is a vector containing the control variables introduced above.
Finally, ηi are country ﬁxed eﬀects.
The regression is an unbalanced panel analysis, since some of the data are not available
of all countries and periods. This Section will present 3 sets of regression results explaining
economic growth. Table 3 presents the results when the growth equation is estimated with
OLS without taking into account the endogeneity of both IMF and WB loans (and of their
interaction). Then the analysis is replicated using instruments for the IMF and WB loans
and for their interaction. To account for the endogeneity of the IMF/WB variables we
estimate 2SLS. Since the predicted values of the IMF/WB variables are used instead of the
actual data, 2SLS is fully adequate to account for potential simultaneity.
Table 3 presents results obtained with simple OLS regressions not taking into account
the endogeneity of the IMF/WB variables. The results of the full model are presented in
column 3 of Table 3. In column 1 the variable of interest is the coeﬃcient of the IMF loans,
column 2 reports the coeﬃcient of the WB loan and column 3 reports simultaneously the
coeﬃcients of both IMF and WB loans and of their interaction .While all these results are
reported for comparison, we largely restrict our discussion to the full model in column 3.
We can actually observe that the coeﬃcients of all regressions are robust to the inclusion of
our variables of interest, one at the time.
As our variables of interest are concerned, we observe that the impact on growth of IMF
l o a n si sn e g a t i v ea n ds i g n i ﬁcant at 1% while the coeﬃcient of WB loans is not signiﬁcant,
To the contrary the coeﬃcient of the interaction term is signiﬁcant and positive at 5%. This
17evidence seems to suggest that when these two institutions are jointly involved in a country
they are more eﬃcient in promoting growth respect to the case in which they work “on their
own.”
As can be seen most explanatory variables have the expected impact on growth. Growth
rates signiﬁcantly increases with lower initial GDP, lower inﬂation, lower government con-
sumption. While GDP growth increases with higher investments, higher openness, higher
ﬁnancial development, higher debt service, as expected..As the institutional variable are
concerned we ﬁnd that lower internal conﬂict increase growth at 1% (as expected) while the
coeﬃcient of corruption is negative and highly signiﬁcant, which seems to suggest that higher
corruption is good for growth. The results reported in Table 3, however, are not conclusive
because of the non-casual sample selection.
Table 4 present results when IMF and WB loans and their interaction term are instru-
mented employing 2SLS. First of all, the reported diagnostic tests assure that our choice of
instruments is good as they are correlated with the endogenous regressors (conditioned on
the full information set in the second stage speciﬁcation) and not correlated with the error
term of the growth regression (Hansen test). Moreover, as reported in the diagnostic tests in
the appendix we also observe that the coeﬃcients of our endogenous regressors in the growth
equation are jointly signiﬁcant (Anderson and Rubin test).
The results of the full model are presented in column 3 of Table 4. In column 1 the
variable of interest is the coeﬃcient of the IMF loans, column 2 reports the coeﬃcient of
the WB loan and column 3 reports simultaneously the coeﬃcients of both IMF and WB
loans and of their interaction .As in the previous case, while all these results are reported
for comparison, we largely restrict our discussion to the full model in column 3.20
As our variables of interests are concerned we observe that 2SLS results qualitatively
conﬁrm those of the OLS speciﬁcation: the coeﬃcient of the IMF loans is negative and
signiﬁcant at 1%, the coeﬃcient of the WB disbursements is not signiﬁcant, while the co-
eﬃcient of the interaction term is positive and signiﬁcant at 1%. The sign and signiﬁcance
of the control variables are also conﬁrmed with the only diﬀerence that the coeﬃcient of
the investments is now insigniﬁcant at conventional levels. Thus, the most relevant result is
shown by the term of the interaction term (when instrumented). Speciﬁcally, even if WB and
IMF does not boost the growth when they operate by themselves, the term of the interaction
coeﬃcient is positive and signiﬁcant at conventional level. This is encouraging, because it
suggests that enhancing Bank-Fund cooperation could be a way to make more eﬀective their
intervention.
20We can actually observe that the coeﬀcients of all regressions are robust to the inclusion of our variables
of interest, one at the time.
18Moreover, in order to disentangle the speciﬁce ﬀect (on growth) of each lender in their
interacted term, we calculated the marginal eﬀe c t so ft h i si n t e r a c t i o n( a sd i s p l a y e di nF i g u r e
1). The results show that the marginal eﬀe c to fI M Fl o a n so ng r o w t hi ss i g n i ﬁcant only for
extremely high levels of WB loans (about 80% of a country’s GDP). To the contrary, the
critical amount of IMF loans above which the marginal eﬀect of WB loans on growth are
positive and signiﬁcant is much lower (about 40%). The ﬁrst (marginal) impact, however, is
t h em o r ei n t e r e s t i n go n e :i no u ts a m p l ei ti sn e v e rt h ec a s et h a tac o u n t r yi su n d e ra nI M F
programme only (i.e. without the involvement of the WB). Thus, the interesting case is to
see what changes when our “benchmark” case (i.e., WB only) is changed by the intervention
of the IMF.
5.2 Low and lower middle income countries
Table 5 presents the results when we restrict the types of IMF and WB loans to concessional
(net) loans only in order to obtain a better proxy for their interaction.21 In fact, contrary
to middle income countries, in the case of low income countries (i.e., the recipients of con-
cessional loans) the Fund and the Bank cooperate more formally. We estimated the same
speciﬁcation as in (1) (where X now refers to a vector of net IMF concessional loans and
IDA ﬂows) both considering the full sample and restricting it to only low and lower middle
income countries.22 Even in this case the growth equation is ﬁrst estimated employing OLS
and then 2SLS.23
As above, we start by estimating the growth equation employing OLS. The signs and
the signiﬁcance of the coeﬃcients of our control variables are not substantially changed, as
compared to the other speciﬁcations, with the only exception of the investments which are
now positive and signiﬁcant throughout. The coeﬃcients are also basically unchanged along
the diﬀerent columns
Regarding our variables of interest, we can observe that both the coeﬃcients of IMF and
WB net concessional loans are not signiﬁcant when estimated individually (column 1 and 2,
respectively). In the last column of Table 5, however, the coeﬃcient of the IMF concessional
net loans becomes, quite surprisingly, positive and signiﬁcant, while the coeﬃcient of the
WB remains not signiﬁcant. Finally, the coeﬃcient of the interaction term is negative and
highly signiﬁcant.
21In the GDF (2009) we were able to ﬁnd data only relative to concessional (IMF and IDA) net ﬂows.
The concessional gross disbursements in the GDF dataset are not reported.
22The reduced sample now consists of 86 countries. Among those 19 have received no assistance by neither
organization.
23We have also estimated equation (1) using the “modiﬁed” variables of interests without reducing the
sample of countries. Results do not change substantially and they are available on request.
19Table 6 contains the results obtained with 2SLS. In the last column, the results of the
full model are presented. As our control variables are concerned, we can observe that both
government consumption and openness are no signiﬁcant anymore.24 Most importantly,
quite diﬀerently from the results obtained in the last column of Table 4, we can now conclude
that the IMF and the WB concessional net loans do not signiﬁcantly aﬀect growth: neither
individually nor jointly.
The reliability of these results is however much weaker as compared to those described in
Table 4 as the quota of IMF concessional loans now represent only a very small fraction of its
total disbursements and this circumstance is going to inﬂuence the impact of the interaction
term as well, since the vector of the IDA net ﬂow is multiplied by a vector containing many
zeros. Moreover, the total number of observation is drastically reduced as the countries
sample is restricted to only low income and lower middle income countries (86 countries in







6C o n c l u s i o n s
In this paper we estimated the impact on growth of the joint participation of a country to
an IMF and a WB program, where such simultaneous involvement of a country with both
the IMF and the World Bank works as a proxy for Bank-Fund cooperation. Ceteris paribus,
we assume that it is easier, and hence more likely, that the IMF and the WB exchange
information and cooperate more when their staﬀ member are on a mission in the same
country at the same time, as compared to the case in which each of them is “involved”
individually.
Estimating a full sample of 128 developing countries by 2SLS we ﬁnd that even if WB and
IMF does not boost the growth when they operate by themselves, the term of the interaction
coeﬃcient is positive and signiﬁcant at conventional level. This result is encouraging as it
suggests that enhancing Bank-Fund cooperation could be a way to make more eﬀective their
intervention.
We have then reduced the sample of countries to low income and lower middle income
24The coeﬃcient of government consumption is negative and signiﬁcan at the 10% level only in column 2.
20countries after restricting the type of loans to IMF and WB concessional (net) loans only.
We believe that in this case the interaction term could be a better proxy for their actual
cooperation as for lower income countries Bank-Fund cooperation has been more formalized.
Unfortunately the greater the degree of accuracy in the choice of the proxy for Bank-Fund
interaction, the lower the number of observation and thus the reliability of our estimates.
In order to avoid such trade oﬀ we plan to extend our analysis by increasing the number
of observations. More speciﬁcally we plan to consider a diﬀerent dependent variables. As
Dollar Svensson (2000) show, at least in the case of the World Bank, reform programs are
measured to be successful when they are (on average) associated with a reduction in the
inﬂation rate or with an improvement in the budget balance.25 We then plan to substitute
the four-year averages of real GDP per capita with the annual change in the inﬂation rate
or in the budget surplus as the “outcome variable” to measure the eﬀects of Bank.Fund
cooperation. This would allow us, at the same time, to focus on the reduced sample of low
income and lower middle income countries (for which the interaction term works as better
proxy for Bank-Fund collaboration) and to increase the number of observation by using
annual data rather than 4-year averages.
25Where such an impact is actually lower the shorter the lag between the outcome year and the end of the
reform period.
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25Table 1: List of countries 
1 Albania  45 Georgia  89 Papua  New  Guinea 
2 Algeria  46 Ghana  90 Paraguay * 
3  Angola **  47 Grenada **  91 Peru 
4 Argentina  48 Guatemala  92 Philippines 
5 Armenia  49 Guinea  93 Poland * 
6 Azerbaijan  50 Guinea-Bissau  94 Romania 
7 Bangladesh  51 Guyana  95 Russian Federation *  
8 Belarus  52 Haiti  96 Rwanda 
9  Belize *   53 Honduras 97 Samoa * 
10  Benin  54 Hungary  98 Sao Tome and Principe 
11  Bhutan **   55 India *  99 Senegal 
12  Bosnia and Herzegovina *   56 Indonesia*  100 Seychelles ** 
13  Botswana **   57 Iran, Islamic Rep. **  101 Sierra Leone 
14 Brazil  58 Jamaica  102 Slovak Republic * 
15 Bulgaria  59 Jordan  103 Solomon Islands * 
16 Burkina  Faso  60 Kazakhstan *  104 South Africa * 
17 Burundi  61 Kenya  105 Sri Lanka 
18 Cameroon  62 Kyrgyz  Republic  106 St. Kitts and Nevis ** 
19  Cape Verde  63 Lao PDR  107 St. Lucia ** 
20  Central African Republic  64 Latria  108 St. Vincent and the Grenadines ** 
21 Chad  65 Lebanon **   109 Sudan * 
22 Chile  66 Lesotho  110 Swaziland ** 
23  China *   67 Liberia *  111 Syrian Arab Republic ** 
24  Colombia *   68 Lithuania  112 Tajikistan 
25 Comoros  69 Macedonia,  FYR  113 Tanzania 
26  Congo, Dem. Rep.  70 Madagascar  114 Thailand 
27 Congo,  Rep.  71 Malati  115 Togo 
28 Costa  Rica  72 Malaysia **  116 Tonga ** 
29 Croatia  73 Maldives **  117 Tunisia *  
30 Cote  d’Ivoire  74 Mali  118 Turkey 
31 Croatia  75 Mauritania  119 Uganda 
32 Dijbouti  76 Mauritius *  120 Ucraine 
33 Dominica  77 Mexico  121 Uruguay 
34 Dominican  Republic  78 Moldova *  122 Uzbekistan * 
35 Ecuador  79 Mongolia  123 Vanuatu ** 
36  Egypt, Arab Rep.  80 Morocco  124 Venezuela, RB 
37 El  Salvador  81 Mozambique  125 Vietnam * 
38 Equatorial  Guinea  82 Nepal  126 Yemen, Rep * 39  Eritrea **   83 Nicaragua 127 Zambia 
40 Estonia  84 Niger  128 Zimbabwe 
41 Ethiopia  85 Nigeria   
42  Fiji **   86 Oman **   
43 Gabon  87 Pakistan   
44 Gambia,  The  88 Panama   
Notes  
** indicates countries where no interaction occurred over the 6 periods  
* indicates countries where no interaction occurred in at least 4 periods  
 Table 2: Sources and definition of selected variables 
Variable  Definition  Unit  Source 
GDPGROWTH  Per capita GDP (constant 2000 US$)  Annual Rate of change  WDI 
WBDISB  Disbursments IBRD and IDA   Ratio to GDP  GDF 
IMFDISB  Disbursments IMF (all programmes)  Ratio to GDP  GDF 
INTER_WBDISB  Interaction wbdisb and imfdisb    GDF 
LOGGDPPC_START Log of per capita GDP at the beginning of the period  Constant 2000 US $  WDI 
INVESTMENT  Gross fixed capital formation Ratio  to  GDP  WDI) 
GOVCONS  General Government Final Consumption Expenditure Ratio to GDP  WDI 
INFLATION  Inflation, consumer price  Annual Rate of change  WDI 
OPENNESS  Export + Import of goods and services  Ratio to GDP  WDI 
M2  Money and quasi money supply  Ratio to GDP  WDI 
CORRUPTION Corruption,  annual  averages  Index  ICRG Political Risk Data 
INT_CONF  Internal conflicts, annual averages  Index  ICRG Political Risk Data 
LIBOR  3 month US Dep. London Offer  Percentage index  IFS 
IMFQUOTA  Subscripted quota at IMF  Million SDR  IFS 
CUMIMF  Cumulative years under an IMF programme  Unit  GDF 
CUMWB  Cumulative years under WB programme  Unit  GDF 
IMFTDS  IMF debt service  Unit   GDF 
WBTDS  IBRD and IDA debt service  Ratio to GDP  GDF DEBTSERVICE   Total debt service  Ratio to exports  WDI 
INLINE_USA  Voting in line with USA in the UNGA  Ratio 
Dreher, Sturm, Vreeland 
(2008b, 2009) 
PROX_EUROPE 
Voting in line with France, Germany and UK in the 
UNGA Ratio 
Dreher, Sturm, Vreeland 
(2008b, 2009) 
UNSC  Being a temporary member of the UNSC  Dummy 
Dreher, Sturm, Vreeland 
(2008b, 2009) 
PRSPpapers 
Having published at least one document concerning 
a PRSP.  Dummy 
WB web site Table 3: Impact of IMF&WB loans on growth, OLS estimation
(1) (2) (3)
IMF loans -3.314*** -8.066***
(-3.314) (-3.075)
WB loans -2.503 -2.002
(-1.255) (-0.985)
IMF loans* WB loans 12.524**
(2.287)
Initial per cap. GDP (log) -13.086*** -13.210*** -13.725***
(-5.501) (-5.117) (-5.293)
Investment/GDP 0.153*** 0.177*** 0.153***
(3.232) (3.891) (3.277)
Government consumption/GDP -0.144*** -0.148*** -0.142***
(-2.746) (-2.947) (-2.764)
Inflation -4.288*** -4.203*** -4.278***
(-3.575) (-3.351) (-3.724)
Openness 0.037*** 0.037*** 0.037***
(3.307) (3.240) (3.216)
M2/GDP 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.004***
(3.737) (3.140) (3.347)
Corruption -0.333*** -0.339*** -0.345***
(-4.013) (-4.093) (-4.158)
Internal conflict 0.270*** 0.268*** 0.265***
(3.798) (3.769) (3.663)
Constant 37.094*** 37.189*** 39.429***
(5.422) (5.026) (5.335)
Observations 435 435 435
R-squared 0.336 0.327 0.345
Number of id 88 88 88
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses: (*) sign. at 10%; (**) sign. at 5%; (***) sign. at 1%
Notes: The dependent variable is the average of the per capita GDP growth over the 4-year
periods: 1982–85,1986-90, …, 2002-05; The regressions include dummies for each country; 
Higer values for internal conflict and corruption indicate "better values”.Table 4: Impact of IMF&WB loans on growth, 2SLS estimation
(1) (2) (3)
IMF loans -1.658 -33.280***
(-1.127) (-2.634)
WB loans -3.621 0.687
(-0.786) (0.103)
IMF loans* WB loans 62.716**
(2.530)
Initial per cap. GDP (log) -13.551*** -14.384*** -15.218***
(-5.476) (-4.649) (-4.392)
Investment/GDP 0.162*** 0.183*** 0.085
(4.036) (4.234) (1.400)
Government consumption/GDP -0.140*** -0.142*** -0.116**
(-3.194) (-3.405) (-1.965)
Inflation -3.938*** -3.961*** -4.012***
(-4.074) (-4.080) (-4.041)
Openness 0.036*** 0.038*** 0.031***
(3.449) (3.402) (2.594)
M2/GDP 0.004*** 0.004* 0.005**
(2.863) (1.786) (2.055)
Corruption -0.333*** -0.327*** -0.403***
(-3.636) (-3.496) (-4.054)
Internal conflict 0.285*** 0.282*** 0.274***
(3.840) (3.817) (3.376)
Joint significance of instruments P-val= 0.0047 P-val=0.0009 P-val=0.0059
Hansen J statistic  P-val=0.0886 P-val=0.2017 P-val= 0.1679
Observations 420 420 420
R-squared 0.336 0.330 0.182
Number of id 84 84 84
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses: (*) sign. at 10%; (**) sign. at 5%; (***) sign. at 1%
Notes: The dependent variable is the average of the per capita GDP growth over the 4-year
periods: 1982–85,1986-90, …, 2002-05; The regressions include dummies for each country; 
Higer values for internal conflict and corruption indicate "better values”.
Last column:
IMF loans are instrumented with IMF debt service, LIBOR, IMF quota and with voting inline with the
US and major Europe in the UN General Assembly
WB loans are instrumented with IMF and WB debt service, IMF quota and  with voting in line with 
major Europe in the UN General Assembly
Interaction variable is instrumented with IMF debt service, cumulative years under IMF programs, 
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Dashed lines give 95% confidence interval.Table 5: Impact of IMF&WB conc net loans on growth, OLS estimation
(1) (2) (3)
IMF conc net loans 0.456 11.730**
(0.161) (2.233)
WB IDA net loans 0.101 0.702
(0.0562) (0.364)
IMF conc net loans* WB IDA net lo -28.392**
(-2.259)
Initial per cap. GDP (log) -10.543*** -10.819*** -9.957***
(-4.643) (-4.332) (-4.159)
Investment/GDP 0.206*** 0.203*** 0.207***
(4.626) (4.770) (4.704)
Government consumption/GDP -0.078 -0.085* -0.083
(-1.571) (-1.681) (-1.651)
Inflation -4.643*** -4.670*** -4.385***
(-3.743) (-3.778) (-3.450)
Openness 0.011 0.013 0.010
(0.963) (1.073) (0.781)
M2/GDP 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006***
(7.498) (5.985) (6.009)
Corruption -0.261*** -0.242*** -0.254***
(-2.840) (-2.738) (-2.772)
Internal conflict 0.341*** 0.343*** 0.332***
(4.727) (4.846) (4.829)
Constant 25.448*** 26.121*** 23.825***
(4.104) (3.887) (3.659)
Observations 287 293 287
R-squared 0.357 0.359 0.370
Number of id 57 58 57
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses: (*) sign. at 10%; (**) sign. at 5%; (***) sign. at 1%
Notes: The dependent variable is the average of the per capita GDP growth over the 4-year
periods: 1982–85,1986-90, …, 2002-05; The regressions include dummies for each country; 
Higer values for internal conflict and corruption indicate "better values”.Table 6: Impact of IMF&WB conc net loans on growth, 2SLS estimation
(1) (2) (3)
IMF conc net loans -4.240* -24.054
(-1.759) (-0.915)
WB IDA net loans -4.159 7.623
(-0.841) (0.850)
IMF net loans* WB IDA loans 32.316
(0.650)
Initial per cap. GDP (log) -11.922*** -11.915*** -10.153***
(-4.570) (-4.398) (-3.299)
Investment/GDP 0.202*** 0.227*** 0.156**
(4.721) (4.405) (2.313)
Government consumption/GDP -0.075 -0.085* -0.065
(-1.623) (-1.959) (-1.148)
Inflation -4.938*** -4.851*** -5.325***
(-4.131) (-3.942) (-3.742)
Openness 0.012 0.016 0.005
(0.950) (1.196) (0.321)
M2/GDP 0.005*** 0.004** 0.007***
(4.100) (2.410) (2.599)
Corruption -0.251** -0.228** -0.293***
(-2.431) (-2.218) (-2.743)
Internal conflict 0.348*** 0.338*** 0.373***
(4.386) (4.313) (4.376)
Joint significance of instruments P-val= 0.0168 P-val=0.0020 P-val=0.0786
Hansen J statistic  P-val=0.4315 P-val=0.1836 P-val= 0.5122
Observations 277 288 282
R-squared 0.348 0.345 0.210
Number of id 54 56 55
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses: (*) sign. at 10%; (**) sign. at 5%; (***) sign. at 1%
Notes: The dependent variable is the average of the per capita GDP growth over the 4-year
periods: 1982–85,1986-90, …, 2002-05; The regressions include dummies for each country; 
Higer values for internal conflict and corruption indicate "better values”.
Last column:
IMF loans are instrumented with IMF debt service, IMF quota and with voting inline with the
US in the UN General Assembly
WB loans are instrumented with IMF debt service, with WB debt service and IMF quota 
Interaction variable is instrumented with IMF debt service, MF quota
and with a country having a PRSP 
Appendix (a):  Diagnostic tests (results of Table 4) 
Variable   Partial Rsq  Test of excluded 
instruments: 
    
IMFLOANS  0.6037  P-value = 0.0000 
WBLOANS  0.1768  P-value = 0.0000 
INTERACTION  0.7066  P-value = 0.0025 
    
Kleibergen-Paap* P-val=0.0017   
Anderson-Rubin** P-val=0.0040   
 
(*) Underidentification test  (Wald test) 





Appendix (b):  Diagnostic tests (results of Table 6) 
Variable   Partial Rsq  Test of excluded 
instruments: 
    
IMFLOANS  0.4473  P-value = 0.0003 
WBLOANS  0.1401  P-value = 0.0017 
INTERACTION  0.5903  P-value = 0.0011 
    
Kleibergen-Paap* P-val=0.0754   
Anderson-Rubin** P-val=0.2747   
 
(*) Underidentification test  (Wald test) 




 Appendix (c): Descriptive Statistics (Estimation sample of column 3, Table 4)
Variable Mean St.Dev. Min Max
GDP growth 1.57 3.38 -7.46 13.59
Initial per cap. GDP 2.98 0.47 2.03 3.94
Investment/GDP 20.44 6.03 5.92 44.03
Government consumption/GDP 13.75 5.09 2.71 40.09
Inflation 0.15 0.18 -0.04 0.98
Openness 67.86 35.74 13.62 217.59
M2/GDP 37.44 52.13 7.46 992.31
Corruption 5.42 1.8 0.17 10
Internal conflict 8.07 2.48 0.54 12
IMF loans 0.05 0.11 0 1.63
WB loans 0.11 0.13 -0.002 0.99
IMF loans* WB loans 0.01 0.05 0 0.87
LIBOR 5.79 2.5 2.05 10.59
IMF quota 0.65 0.22 0.0698 0.98
Cumulative years under IMF 1.45 1.63 0 6
Debt service 20.75 12.96 1.28 91.74
IMF debt service 0.006 0.01 0 0.17
WB debt service 0.006 0.006 0 0.05
Voting in line with the US in the UNGA 0.31 0.09 0.16 0.6
Proximity to Europe in the UNGA 0.63 0.08 0.49 0.86
Temporary member of the UNSC 0.08 0.17 0.00 0.50